| 1. | A concession contract can be regarded as a payoff contract under the framework of principal - agent theory . it needs to meet the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of concessionaire . the payoff designing can be analyzed by the backward - induction method
特许权合约可以看作一个委托代理框架下的报酬合约，需要满足特许权人的参与约束和激励相容约束条件，报酬设计可以使用逆序递推的方法分析。 |
| 2. | Not only the special factors affecting each economic parameter but also the mutual limitation among and optimization of economic parameters are put into consideration under the condition of the overall targets of concession contracts , thus conclusions more suitable to the practical conditions are obtained
在分析中，不仅考虑影响每个经济参数的特殊因素，还考虑了在合约整体目标条件下各个经济参数之间的相互制约优化问题，得出了更符合现实条件的结论。 |
| 3. | Article 18 within the concession period , the relevant administrative departments shall have the power to inspect , evaluate and audit the concessionary projects , and correct the concessionaires ' acts in violation of the provisions of laws , regulations or rules as well as the concession contracts and give punishments according to law till call back the concession according to law
第十八条特许期限内，有关行政主管部门有权对特许项目进行检查、评估、审计，对特许经营者违反法律、法规、规章规定和特许协议约定的行为应当予以纠正并依法处罚，直至依法收回特许权。 |
| 4. | In order to solve the choice problem of parameters in contracts , a numerical simulation method for the economic analysis of concession contracts is put forward , which simulates the present value of net cash flow ( npv ) and gets the probability distribution with different parameters in concession contracts so as to establish the correlation between parameters and npv distribution
为了解决特许权合约设计中具体确定合约参数水平的问题，本文提出了特许权合约设计经济分析的数值模拟方法。对不同合约参数下特许权项目的净现金流量现值npv的模拟，可以得到不同参数下的npv概率分布，建立合约参数与npv分布之间的对应关系。 |
| 5. | Under the whole designing framework of concession contracts , the choice of such main economic parameters as products or service price , concession period , rate of return on investment , governmental support in infrastructure concession contracts is comprehensively and systematically analyzed in this dissertation
本文把基础设施特许权合约中的主要经济参数水平的选择，诸如产品或服务价格、特许权期限、投资回报率、政府提供的支持等，放在合约设计的整体框架下进行综合系统分析。 |
| 6. | Under the condition of asymmetric distribution of npv probability , the probability of npv less than 0 can more accurately describe the risk of investment retun then the probability of npv less than 0 that concessionaire may accepted determines the condition satisfied by the economic parameters of concession contracts . with the premises of expected objective value of each parameter fixed by the designers of concession contracts and the weighted value of this parameter , an optimal objectiv
特许权人可以接受的npv小于零的概率决定了特许权合约经济参数需要满足的条件，在特许权合约设计者可以对每个参数确定一个初始的期望目标值和该参数的权重条件下，本文通过构造一个优化目标函数，解决了合约经济参数的优化选择问题。 |
| 7. | The designing of concession contracts involves many complex legislative and economic issues , such as the financial situations of governments , optimization of resources , protection of consumers " benefits , incentive firms to rational investment , improvement of production and operation efficiency of concessionaire , etc . with the rational return on investment as a kernel issue in the designing of concession contracts , the comprehensive economic parameters are integrated analyzed in this dissertation in order to realize the multiple targets of governments in concession projects
特许权合约设计需要考虑政府的财政能力、实现资源优化配置、保护消费者利益、激励特许权人进行合理投资和提高生产经营效率，涉及许多复杂的经济问题。在合约设计中，这些问题的分析需要围绕投资者实现合理的投资回报来进行，对特许权合约的诸多经济参数综合分析，以实现政府在特许权项目中的多重目标。 |
| 8. | Where there is a plan to operate the existing urban infrastructure by means of concessionary management stipulated in item ( 2 ) of article 3 of these measures , upon approval of the municipal people ' s government , the concession may be granted by direct commission and the competent industrial department of urban infrastructure shall conclude a concession contract with the concessionaire
现有城市基础设施拟采取本办法第三条第二项规定的特许经营方式运营的，经市人民政府批准，也可以采取直接委托的方式授予特许权，并由城市基础设施行业主管部门与特许经营者签订特许协议。 |
| 9. | Based on existing study findings , payoff of concession contracts , especially when the government guarantees on revenue are available , is studied under the condition of insufficiently competitive concession bidding and incomplete concession contracts in this dissertation . main conclusion is put forward without the hypothesis of concrete patterns of demand / revenue probability distribution
本文对收入有政府担保条件下的报酬设计进行了重点研究，主要结论可以在不对收入(需求量)的概率分布形式做具体规定条件下得到，具有更广泛的适应性。 |
